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Mass Art, High Art, and the Avant .. Garde: 
A Response to David Novitz 
Koel Carroll 
David Novitz's very lively response co my theory of mass art comes in three 
parts: 1 )  a rejection of my characceri:ation of the view chat he put forch in 
his article "Ways of Anmaking: The High and the Popular in Art"; 2 )  an 
artack on the positive theory that I propounded in my article "The Nature 
of Mass Art"; and 3) a proposal of his own theory of mass an. In what 
follows I will cake up each of these issues in cum. 1 
I. Carroll's lnt.erpret.ation of Nooitz 
In "The Nature of Mass Art," I attributed to Novitz what I called the 
"Elimination Theory of Mass Art." This is the view that "there really is no 
such thing as mass art, aparc from the role certain objects play in reinforc ­
ing pre-existing social class distinctions and identities." Novitz denies that 
he holds such a view. Rather, he maintains chat his essay was intended to 
explain how we happen co have the distinction between popular art and 
high art. Moreover, he asserts chat the reinforcing of class distinctions is no 
part of his explanation. 
Now it seems co me chat there is some ambiguity in Novia's original 
essay about what he cakes himself to be explaining. Explaining how we 
happen co have the distinction between popular art and high art can be 
thought to involve at least: l) how the distinction emerged h istorically; or, 
2) how it continues to thrive in our society. I would have thought that 
Novitz's original essay had answers to both these questions, though in his 
response he now claims to have offered only an answer to the first ques­
tion. 
His explanation of the emergence of the distinction is a fairly well 
known one, advanced by, for example, Peter Burger, among others, in his 
Theory of the Avant-Garde in the early seventies. le is chat "serious" artists 
in the nineteenth century reached for aesthetic separatism - in a way that 
cleaved popular art from high art - as a means co prevent arc from being 
subsumed under the dominant category of, broadly speaking, utilitarian­
market value. Whether this explanation is successful, of course, depends 
upon its ability to deal with certain incongruous facts - viz., that anti­
aesthetic high art, which also sustained an animus to what was thought of 
as popular art, arose quickly on the heels of aestheticism - and upon its 
ability to deal with certain rival theories - e.g., that the aesthetic separat, 
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L.Sm co which l'ovitz alludes really emerged m the eighteenth century. 
Neverchele s, it is true chac �ovic:: does offer che afore a1J explanation of 
che emergence o( the discinccion between popular an anJ high art. 
However, even if �ov1t:' explanation of rhe emergenc� of che di rinc­
tion is persuasive, that still leave open the que tion of why the distincnon 
still has any force. Of course, one explananon might be that the consider­
ations chat first brought the distinction inco being tiU compel us. Yet, nor 
only does chis seem unlikely, but Novitz him elf seem to deny it. Rather, 
he maintains chat che distinction was, as we say nowadays, "co,opted." He 
writes: "art for art's sake, and the formalism that was pan of it, floated to 
che 'cop' of the society, to a cultured elite who saw themselves as a cut 
above the vulgar, the popular, arts. What begins to emerge is chat the 
distinction between high art and popular arc does not merely distinguish 
different types of arc, but, much more than chis, it actually accentuates and 
reinforces tradicional class divisions wich capitalist sociecy.1 And lacer he 
maintains that ''the distinction between the high arcs and the popular arcs . . l ") 1s a soc1a one .. . .  
Now I submit chat if we ask what che basis of the continued force of chis 
social distinction is, in the context of Novitz's essay, a natural, unstrained 
reading produces the obvious answer chat it is the reinforcement of 
traditional class divisions. I do not see how Novitz can deny that chis is 
implied by his essay. On the ocher hand, if we grant the author the 
perogative to have the final say in this matter, then I think that there is a 
problem with Novitz's essay that I did not remark upon in "The Nature of 
Mass Arc," viz., it is not an adequate social explanation of the distinction 
between high art and popular art. For it does not explain the continued 
existence of the distinction. As I see it, Novitz is now faced with a di, 
lemma: either he admits to the reinforcement hypothesis or there is an 
explanatory lacuna in his theory. Taking the former horn of the dilemma 
indicates that he does buy into the Elimination Theory (as I have defined 
it), while taking the latter horn of the dilemma gives him a less convincing 
theory than the one that I attributed to him. 
Novitz maintains that he is not a proponent of the Elimination Theory 
because social facts are real. Thus, he believes that popular art really exists. 
Here, I believe that our apparent differences are purely verbal. I wrote, as 
Novitz himself confirms by quotation, that the Elimination Theorist holds 
that "there really is no such thing as popular or mass art, apart from the role 
certain objects play in reinforcing pre,existing social class distinctions and 
identities" (emphasis added). 
Notice that the italicized qualification in this characterization of the 
Elimination Theory allows that the elimination theorist may grant that the 
distinction is a real one, but only at the social level. My point, as the 
preceding quotation indicates, relied upon enlisting the ordinary language 
contrast between "really" versus "conventionally." If Novitz wants to reject 
this contrast on the grounds that conventions are real, I am happy to go 
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along with chis, and co rephrase the characterization as "Elimination 
Theorists do not think that the high art/popular art distinction exists 
except as a convention" (specifically as a convention motivated by class 
interests) . 
There is not much difference, as I see it, between this and what I 
originally wro!Ce, and I believe that both formulations capture the view 
expressed in "Ways of Artmaking." If Novitz's problem is with the label 
"Elimination Theory," then let us change it to "The Social Reduction 
Theory" - where it is understood that the relevant reduction is to social 
facts. That will still be enough for me to run my argument. 
Lastly, Novitz criticizes my characterization of his view on the grounds 
that I illicitly inferred from his social reduction theory of popular art that 
he held a social reduction theory of mass art. The ground for my original 
inference is simple. At the time that I wrote my essay, Novitz drew no 
distinction between popular art and mass art. Now, in the face of my 
criticism, he has drawn one. That is, he has produced a theory of mass arc. 
Thus, at this stage in the dialectic, whether my inference was illicit is a less 
pressing question than whether Novitz's new, rival theory of mass art is 
superior to my own. I will turn to this issue in the last section of my 
rebuttal. But before engaging that topic, let me address Novitz's criticisms 
of my positive theory of mass art. 
2. Novitt s Criticisms 
In reviewing Novitz1s objections to my theory, I have the recurrent sense 
that he has misconstrued my project. It was my intention to offer an 
analysis of mass art in the contemporary world. However, I do announce 
that my theory will also pertain to certain works from earlier periods; 
indeed, I expliicitly admit that the novel is one important, potential source 
of mass art which predates our current age of mass culture. Thus, it comes 
as somewhat of a surprise to me that Novitz's major counterexamples to 
my theory are nineteenth century novels. For insofar as I acknowledge that 
novels are apt to be covered by the theory, it is difficult to see how, in 
principle, they constitute counterexamples. Indeed, I would count most 
eighteenth century novels of the Gothic variety as mass art. And, of 
course, I will count pulp novels of any vintage as mass art. Thus, why 
novels -"drawn from a hat" in the manner Novitz does - should weigh 
against my theory is a mystery. 
Of course, I would question whether a novel like James Joyce's 
Finnegan's Wake is an instance of mass art. But that is an avant-garde 
novel. I am committed to 1the view that avan1t-garde novels are not mass 
art. But none ofNovitz's putative counterexamples are avant .. garde novels. 
Novitz places a great deal of emphasis on the fact that my theory may 
count works from earlier centuries as mass art. I certainly concede this 
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more than once in my essay, and with certain cases, I am more than ready 
to bite the buUet and agree that they are mass art - for example, I 
mention Japanese woodcuts (see "The Nature of Mass Arc." footnote 4 l ) .  
Novitz seems ro think thac this is a problem, but I don't. Rather. it is co be 
expected when one is analyzing the concept of an historical phenomenon 
that emerges over time. 
When Marx analyses the concept of the commodity which was and 
remains central to capitalise exchange, he admits that the account may 
apply to pre,capitalist objects. Indeed, this is what we would anticipate of a 
form that evolved over a historical process. Bue his account is nor compro, 
mised by chis. His analysis is no less instructive. Similarly, when I analyse 
the notion of the mass art objects that are central to contemporary mass 
culture, the fact that my analysis picks out historical forebears should not 
problematize my analysis. 
Speaking broadly, the biggest worry that Novitz has about my theory is 
that he believes that it precludes the possibility of high art being mass arc. 
But here I believe chat he has simply misread me. I never claim that high 
art as such cannot be mass art. Rather, I maintain that avant,garde art -
which, I assert, "has the best claim to being the high art of our epoch" -
cannot be mass art. Though I may be historically wrong in regarding avant, 
garde art as the high art of our times, from a logicai point of view, I have 
not precluded the possibility that some high art is mass art. If Oliver Twist 
is high art, it may very well be mass art as well. Moreover, since most of 
Novitz's counterexamples are motivated by his misperception that I am 
committed to the view that in principle high art cannot he mass art, many 
of his objections miss their mark before they even get off the ground. 
My theory of mass art states three conditions which are individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for something to count as mass art. To 
iterate: x is a mass artwork if and only if l) x is an artwork 2) produced and 
distributed by a mass delivery technology 3) which is intentionally de, 
signed to gravitate in its structural choices toward those choices which 
promise accessibility for the largest number of untutored (or relatively 
untutored) audiences. Novitz leaves the first condition unquestioned, and 
he lavishes his attention on the second and third conditions. 
Novitz's attack on the second condition - the mass technology 
condition - is strange in several respects. On the one hand, he advances 
certain counter examples against this condition, like trinkets, as if this 
condition alone was necessary and sufficient for counting something as 
mass art. But, of course, since this condition is only a necessary condition, 
it should come as no surprise that non,mass art objects might share this 
feature with mass art objects and yet not count as mass art since they are 
precluded by the other conditions in the theory. For example, trinkets may 
not count as mass art because they fail to meet the first condition - i.e., 
they may not be art. (I say "may," here, because in some instances certain 
so,called trinkets may be art; what is needed to make this discussion 
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fruitful would be a concrete, historical case of a sort that Novitz fails to 
provide). 
On the other hand, a second jarring feature of Novitz1s attack on the 
mass technology condition is that despite his objections to it, he appears to 
take it up unrevised when he comes to advancing his own theory of mass 
art. One must wonder why if the mass technology condition is as filmsy as 
Novitz adverts, he later embraces it. 
One of Novitz's counterexamples to m)' theory is a recording of a piece 
by Mozart. This example is ambiguous. It blurs the distinction between the 
artwork as composition and the artwork as performance. Surely, Mozart's 
original composition is not a mass artwork. So we must be talking about 
some performance, where the performance in question is an electronically 
constructed one, rather than a mere recording. Is this a counterexample to 
my theory of mass art? 
I think not. For I do not preclude that a work that we think of as high 
art can be a work of mass art. I only deny that a work of avant,garde art 
can be mass art. And Mozart's music is not avant,garde. So a Mozart 
recording of the sort in question may be a work of mass art depending upon 
whether it meels my other criteria - notably the third condition which we 
may call the accessibility condition. My hunch is that such a performance 
will not meet the accessibility condition, but I could be wrong here. And, if 
I am .wrong, I am nevertheless willing to live with consequence that part of 
the contemporary recording industry's production of what is called 
classical music belongs to mass culture. 
Again, I doubt that I will be driven to this conclusion in any way that I 
should find embarrassing once we attend to particular cases. For I predict 
that most of the relevant classical music will fail to meet my accessibility 
condition. Of course, there is what might be labeled the "Boston Pops/ 
Hollywood Bowl phenomena": classical music that has been doctored, 
edited or taken out of context in order to make it accessible. Recordings of 
this sort might plausibly count as mass art, or, perhaps more accurately, 
middle,brow art (see "The Nature of Mass Art,11 footnote 32). But he 
existence of such recordings does not compromise the distinction that I am 
out to draw between contemporary mass art and avant,garde art (i.e., 
contemporary high art) that, in addition, is produced and delivered by a 
mass technology. 
Undoubtedly, Novitz would attempt to block the move I attempted to 
make two paragraphs ago when I denied that Mozart's compositions were 
mass art. For Novitz has a very expansive view of mass technology. For 
him, very few works of art do not involve a mass delivery technology. 
Among these mass technologies he includes paper and pencil, inked quills 
and vellum, fountain pens and sketch books. So if Mozart had access to a 
pen and a piece of paper, then he had access to a mass delivery technology. 
However, I think that it strains our ordinary sense of English to regard a 
pen and a piece of paper as a mass delivery technology. Indeed, I think 
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that in ordinary English, it lS bi:arre to call pen and ink a .. technology." 
Doesn't the relevant sense of .. technology" have connotation of inJu tnal 
production? [ stipulated that a mass delivery technology wa a technolog)· 
with the capacity co deliver the ame performance or object co more than 
one reception site simultaneou ly. And, I not only quesrion whether 
Mozart could write fast enough ro do this; I also wonder whether pencil 
and paper constitutes a technology in any natural understanding of that 
word. 
Novitz also claims that the belly of a violin is a mass technology 
according to my stipulation, since it can deliver a sound co more than one 
reception site at the same time. However, here he overlooks my observa­
tion (see "The Na cure of Mass Art,» footnote J 7) that in discriminating 
discrete reception sites, we ""ill need to seek guidance from ordinary 
language where, of course, it is not customary co regard the front and the 
back of a concert hall as discrete reception sites. 
In disputing the mass technology condition of my theory of mass arc, 
Novitz raises the case of Steven Spielberg thinking up the plot of his next 
movie. This is supposed to count against the requirement that mass 
artworks be produced and distributed by a mass delivery technology. I 
don'c see why. If Steven Spielberg fails to make that plot into a film by 
means of the mass technology of the movies, his musings hardly comprise a 
mass artwork, or even pan of one. Any Hollywood contract lawyer will 
support me on this one. Of course, I never maintained that a mass tech­
nology was the only ingredient in the production of a mass artwork, but 
that it was simply a necessary ingredient. On the other hand, doesn''t 
Novitz's Spielberg example begin to insinuate a commitment to a rather 
suspicious tenet of Idealism? 
In my view, the most interesting condition in my theory is the third 
condition which we can refer to as the accessibility condition. This 
condition distinguishes mass art from avant,garde art - i.e., the high art of 
our time - and, therefore, distinguishes mass art from avant,garde arc that 
is produced and distributed via a mass delivery technology. However, it is 
the accessibility condition that Novitz appears to regard as the least 
palatable element in my theory. 
According to the accessibility condition, what we refer to as mass art in 
our culture must be such that it is designed to gravitate in its structural 
and stylistic choices (and perhaps even in its content) towards choices that 
are easily accessible to mass untutored audiences. What is called mass art 
in our culture has a function - to elicit and to engage mass audiences. In 
order to do this it must be designed in a way that is accessible to mass 
audiences. This, in tum, broadly determines or constrains the structures, 
styles and even subjects i t  tends to deploy. Specifically, it gravitates to 
those structural and stylistic choices that best realize its function, viz., ones 
that are easily accessible, virtually on first exposure, to masses of untutored 
audiences. 
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Novitz questions the notion of untu tored audiences that I invoke in. rhe 
accessibility condition. He chinks that if a specimen of mass an involves 
the use of a natural language, then the audiences must at least be tutored 
in the language in question. In order co understand an English,speakin.g 
film. one needs co understand English. And the acquisition of English 
requires cucoring. 
First, it is not clear that following an English,speaking film like Al ien 3 
or Mad Max always does require fac ility in English (and my account of 
mass art helps explain why this should be so). But even granting that much 
mass art may require facility in a relevant natural language. chis does not 
cut against my claims about untutored audiences. For in my sense of 
rurnred, the tutoring at issue involves training in specialized background 
knowledge, including training in deciphering erudite codes, cues, implica, 
tions, and allusions. But one does not need specialized training in order to 
understand mass artworks in one's own language; one already knows one's 
own language. No special tutoring is required. 
Moreover, the English speaker who watches a Hong Kong film does nor 
require special tutorials to follow the mass art structures deployed in a 
Jackie Chan movie. And in order to deal with whatever language difficul, 
ties these films may present, mass film distributors most frequently resort to 
dubbing such films into languages the relevant audiences already speak, or, 
less frequently, they resort to subtitles in languages the relevant audiences 
already read. Indeed, the preference for dubbing over subtitles confinns the 
tendency in the mass arts to gravitate toward choices that presuppose the 
least amount of uncommon knowledge across the targeted mass audiences. 
Novitz finds my claims about untutored audiences unconvincing 
because he thinks that audiences need background knowledge about the 
law, about mental illness, parody, human foibles, and so on in order to 
follow L.A. Liw and Twin Peaks. Now I'm not sure you need to know 
anything about mental illness in order to follow Twin Peaks. The back, 
ground information relevant here would be better found in horror films 
than in medical journals; while most of the required legal "knowledge" 
required by L.A. Law that is not supplied directly (and accessibly) by the 
narration itself probably comes to the viewer from having been exposed to 
previous law shows. That is, if these TV programs require any background 
training, it comes from the province of mass art itself which, as my theory 
contends, tutors its audience to a limited extent through formulaic 
repetition. Thus, neither Twin Peaks nor L.A. Law confound what I say 
about untutored audiences. 
Novitz fears that the notion of accessibility that I employ is dubious. For 
what is accessible to one person may not be accessible to another. Some 
people may find Mozart and Shakespeare more accessible than rap. 
Granted. But this misses the issue. The question is about what masses of 
untutored people find easily accessible. It does not seem plausible to 
suppose that masses of untutored people find The Tempest more accessible 
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than "Fight the Power." Novitz may respond that masses of people could 
be trained so that they find The T empesc accessible. But then they would 
not be untutored. Nor would their new found access to The T empesr 
diminish their grasp of "Fight the Power ... 
Novitz notes that accessibility may change over time. I wouldn't wane 
to dispute this. But that does not challenge my theory . My theory main, 
rains chat mass art has a function which predisposes it to search out easily 
accessible structures. At time t 5, mass art gravitates coward the most 
easily accessible structures available at time t 5. At time t l5, a mass 
artwork of chat vintage will seek out the most easily accessible structure 
available at t IS. Needless to say, the most easily accessible structures 
available at t 15 may differ from those at t 5. lris shots, for example, may be 
later replaced by close,ups. 
Thus, that degrees of accessibility may change with history does not 
challenge the claim that mass art gravitates toward what is most accessible. 
Mass art tends in the direction of accessibility, specifically in terms of what 
is accessible in the context of its production, even though what counts as 
accessible at one point in time may undergo mutation later. 
My third condition - the accessibility condition - is a functional, 
structural requirement for mass art. That the function in question might be 
realized by different structures at different times does not contravene the 
requirement in question. Marx claimed that the forces of production 
gravitate toward maximizing productivity. This generalization, though 
perhaps false, is not undermined by noting that at one point in history the 
forces of production are steam,driven and at another point they are 
electrically powered. Likewise, mass art, given its function, gravitates 
toward accessible structures - i.e., accessible in context. This is a struc, 
tural requirement even if, given the historical circumstances, the specific 
structures in question vary somewhat. 
Nor is this concession to history on my part something that should 
astound Novitz. I advertise that I am dealing with historical phenomena 
throughout my essay. I only deny that exclusively historical considerations 
can provide an account of mass art. I never contend that history should 
have no role to play in our understanding of mass art. Whether I invoke 
history in the application of my theory does not undercut my view despite 
what Novitz suggests at the end of the second section of his essay. I would 
have given up the game only if I had been forced to admit that my theory 
involves only historical considerations. But Novitz's objections have not 
compelled me to that admission. 
Novitz's leading counterexample to my accessibility condition is Sense 
and Sensibility. Presumably it is art; I won't quibble with that. And, it is 
certainly distributed by means of a mass delivery technology: the printing 
press. Is it mass art? On my view that depends upon whether it meets the 
accessibility condition. Whether it does requires a careful inspection of the 
novel in question and its historical context. Unfortunately, Novitz 
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provides us with neither. So I am unsure about how we should categorize 
Sense and Sensibi.liry. 
But whether, once scrutinized, it is categorized as mass art, my theory is 
not threatened, since I countenance some (indeed, many) \videly marketed 
novels - including not only pulps but well-written ones as well - as mass 
arrworks. On the other hand, if. upon close examination, Sense and 
Sensibility turns out not to be mass art because it is not easily accessible to 
mass untutored audiences, that's okay too, since I agree that some novels 
are not mass an. In any case, Sense and Sensibili.ty will not present a clear·­
cut counterexample to anything I've claimed until Novitz tells us more 
about it, or, at least, more about what he thinks about it. 
Actually, I have to confess that I'm really not sure what Novitz intends 
to prove by means of Sense and Sensibility. Is it that he thinks that it is mass 
art, but my theory unjustifiably excludes it? Or, is it that he thinks that i( is 
not mass art, but that my theory fails to exclude it, as he, Novitz, thinks 
my theory should? The text, unpromisingly, suggests each of these prob­
lems in different places. First, Novitz says that Austen did design her works 
to be accessible, which suggests the former objection, but later he says that 
her works were not so designed, which suggests the latter objection. But 
these objections cancel each other out. Novitz can't have it both ways. 
A charitable interpretation of Novitz's understanding of Sense and 
Sensibility is probably that Austen intended her novels to be accessible to 
her readership, but not to be accessible to mass untutored audiences -
where "her readership" and "mass untutored audiences" are not co­
extensive. Of course, whether Austen designed Sense and Sensibility to be 
accessible to her readership is irrelevant to whether it is mass art in my 
sense of the category; Stockhausen undoubtedly designed his works to be 
accessible to his (rather specialized) audience. Thus, if Novitz in his role as 
literary historian is right - of course, I am not agreeing that he is- and 
Austen did not design Sense and Sensibility for easy accessibility by mass 
untutored audiences, then on my theory it would not count as mass art. 
Yet in his conclusion Novitz claims to have shown that on my theory, Jane 
Austen's novels are mass art. Of course, this conclusion will not upset my 
applecart for reasons I've already rehearsed. However, I cannot refrain 
from remarking that this surmise on Novitz's part contradicts what seems 
to me the most charitable interpretation of his earlier, already conflicting 
remarks. 
Novitz' s Theory of Mass Art 
Novitz concludes his disagreement with my theory of mass art by pro­
pounding a view of his own. On Novitz's view, "a mass work of art is 1) a 
work of art 2) whose production or delivery involves the use of mass 
technology 3) with the intention thereby a delivering the work to as many 
10
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 23 [1992], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/3
60 Noe,I CArroll 
people as possible." The major difference between my theory and Novic:'s 
is chat his theory is not committed to the view that mass artworks are 
always designed to be understood by large numbers of viewers; they need 
only be intended to be delivered co lots of people. 
According to Noviu there are two senses of mass an. The first sense of 
mass art pertains to items produced and delivered by a technology capable 
of delivering it to two reception sites simultaneously. The second sense of 
mass art pertains to items designed to be understood by large numbers of 
untutored people. Novitz says chat I run these two sens.es together. I 
wouldn't have thought that I conflated these two senses; I constructed an 
account of mass art where each of these discriminable senses plays a role as 
a necessary condition of mass art. Is that a matter of running the two 
senses together? Or, is it a matter of constructing a third, more adequate 
sense of the term? 
Novitz also claims that I have given no argument for my "running 
together" of these conditions. Specifically, Noviu is leary of my invocation 
of the accessibility condition. But despite Novitz's accusation, I thought 
that I offered a number of arguments in favor of this move. The first was 
that it did a better job than rival accounts of tracking the notion of mass 
art as that term has been used in our common discourse throughout this 
century. When someone like Dwight Macdonald excoriates mass culture 
and its products, what he is talking about are putative artworks that are 
not only mass produced but which are designed for easy consumption by 
mass audiences. 
Noviu believes that his theory only emphasizes the first sense of mass 
art. But the first sense of mass art is not enough. In ordinary discourse, 
most of us would hestitate to call the films of Stan Brakhage mass art, 
though they are produced and distributed by a mass technology. My theory 
of mass art is sensitive to that hesitancy. My theory tracks usage better 
than a view of mass art that relies primarily on Novitz's first sense of the 
term. And, that is a dialectical argument in favor of the way I build my 
theory. 
Second, I maintain that my theory of mass art has useful explanatory 
consequences for the empirical study of mass art. For one can derive an 
instructive explanatory hypothesis from the accessibility condition of my 
theory. Indeed, my third condition might be read as informing a broad 
research program, viz., if one wishes to isolate the key features of what in 
our culture we refer to as mass art, look for those structures, stylistic 
choices and even narrative themes that enhance the accessibility of the 
objects in question for mass untutored audiences. That is, investigate the 
structures of the items that we pretheoretically think of as mass art in 
terms of their capacity to engage mass untutored audiences. Therein lies 
an important part of an account of their emergence, their popularity and 
their continued existence. That my theory of mass art promises explana, 
tory advantages for empirical research represents yet another consideration 
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in favor of the way in which I construct my theory. 
On the other hand, Novitz says that his theory emphasizes the first 
sense of mas5 an noted above - the technology sense. I am not sure why 
Novitz is so relaxed about this given the pummeling to which he subjected 
my technology condition in the second section of his rebuttal of my theory. 
Perhaps by his conclusion, he feels that he has learned to live with my 
technology condition. But I think that it is obvious that one cannot hope 
co proffer a theory of what we call mass art chat places primary emphasis 
on the technology sense of mass art. That simply ignores too much avant­
garde art of the sort that is produced and distributed by means of mass 
cechnology. 
According to Novitz's theory, something is a mass artwork when it is a 
work of art, involving the use of a mass delivery system with the intention 
co deliver the work to as many people as possible. Thus, if a group of 
avant-gardists commandeered a network television frequency in order to 
present a highly hermetic drama for the express purpose of not only 
outraging the bourgeoisie, but of confounding just about everyone else, 
chat would count as a work of mass art on Novitz's view. That is, our 
avant-gardists intend co deliver their production to as many people as 
possible while at che same time they intend to dumbfound that audience in 
a gesture of artistic contempt. But is this the sort of phenomenon that 
people have in mind when they talk about mass art? 
Novitz thinks that an advantage of his theory over mine is that he can 
count a BBC production as mass art whereas I do not. But I am not so sure 
that the issue is so clear cut. If the BBC production is designed to be 
accessible to mass untutored audiences - layered with explanatory 
interludes, parsed by a barrage of cinematic techniques and edited for TV 
- such a production might be mass art on my view. On the other hand, if 
the performance is intentionally designed in a way that renders it still 
inaccessible to a mass audience, I see no problem in treating it on a par 
with avant-garde art that is produced and delivered by means of a mass 
technology. Surely it cannort count as an advantage of Novitz's theory that 
it can regard esoteric art as mass art. 
Clearly, the major bone of contention between Novitz and myself is 
that I see our reigning concept of mass art as bound up in large part with a 
contrast between it and esoteric, avant-garde art. Though these two art 
practices do not exhaust the full range of the art of our time, they are the 
most conspicuous and the most dominant art practices in our culture -
practices that define themselves in large measure in opposition to each 
other. That my theory tracks this distinction -which is reflected in our 
continuing, common discourse about mass art - and that Novitz's theory 
erases this opposition counts in favor of my theory and against Novitz's. 
That my theory suggests a plausible empirical research program with 
informative results also, I submit, makes my theory more attractive than 
Novitz's. 
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Of course, in a cenain sense, Novitz is free to stipulate any sense of 
mass art that he wishes. However, the advisability of Novitz's stipulation 
must be weighed against the advantages of a rival theory like mine which 
a) does a better job tracking ordinary usage, b) sharply marks the central 
conceptual and historic contrast between mass art and the avant,garde, 
and which c) abets a robust empirical research program. 
Notes 
1 See David Novitz's response - enticled "Noel Carroll's Theory 
of Mass Art" - as well as my original article - "The Nature 
of Mass Art" - in this volume. Novitz's "Ways of Artmaking: 
The High and the Popular in Art"' appeared in The British 
Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 28, no. 3 (Summer, 1989) , pp. 2 1 3, 
229. 
2 Novitz, "Ways of Artmaking," p. 224 (emphasis added) .  
> Novitz, uw ays of Arrmaking," p. 22 7. 
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